Transition of Presidential Power: Institutions and Control
Oleg I. Zaznaev1, Viktor V. Sidorov2

1Oleg I. Zaznaev, Kazan Federal University, Kazan, Russia.
2Viktor V. Sidorov, Kazan Federal University, Kazan, Russia.
Manuscript received on September 23, 2019. | Revised Manuscript received on October 15, 2019. | Manuscript published on October 30, 2019. | PP: 7482-7485 | Volume-9 Issue-1, October 2019 | Retrieval Number: A3121109119/2019©BEIESP | DOI: 10.35940/ijeat.A3121.109119
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Abstract: The transfer of presidential power in a democratic regime is carried out through the institutional mechanism of public competition in elections. In this case, the phenomenon of “democratic uncertainty” arises, since it is not known who will become the winner and take the presidency. Under a democratic deficit regime, the political leader and the ruling elite seek to ensure a controlled transfer of presidential power to maintain their dominant position in politics and economics. The paper considers the models and institutional mechanisms that ensure a controlled transfer of presidential power: the constitutional change of a “second person” in the state; reduction of age or the abolition of the lower age “threshold” for a presidential candidate; creation of new posts; Mexican practice “Dedaso”; change in form of governance; institutional guarantees to the outgoing president.
Keywords: President; Presidential system; Authoritarian regime; Authoritarian control; Transfer of power; Succession; Inheritance; President’s resignation; Terms of office for the president.