Postmodern Project of Philosophy: “Social” Or “Not-Social”?

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Abstract: The article is devoted to the elaboration and formulation of a criterion for distinguishing between the modernist project of social philosophy, which is proposed to be called “social” and “non-social” within the framework of the article. Based on the work of such researchers as Tereshchenko N.A., Gasaryan D.E. and Karimov T.Kh. it is proposed to consider three characteristics of social relations as a criterion: the reflexive attitude of participants to existing social relations; negativity, orientation to the development and overcoming of the existing “state of affairs”, activity of participants; reductionism, the desire to single out a single foundation in society and interpret the entire variety of social facts as its manifestation. In modern society is understood as “social”: it is reflective, negative (develops) and has a foundation. Within the framework of postmodernism, society is understood as “non-social”: it is non-reflective, does not develop, and without foundation. The concept of everyday life of phenomenological sociology is considered as an example of the theory of “non-social”. It is also shown that the distinguished characteristics of “non-social” relate to many theoretical constructions in the field of social philosophy of the second half of the 20th century. And with the current question of the possibility of breaking the postmodern paradigm, when developing alternative programs for studying society (metamodern, post-postmodern, after-postmodern), these criteria should be taken into account.

Keywords: Art Nouveau, postmodern, after-postmodern, social, “non-social”, end of social, phenomenological sociology.

I. INTRODUCTION

After the “death of the social” [Baudrillard] declared by J. Baudrillard, the social dimension, social reality as part of our life, as our everyday life did not disappear, however, in the social sciences and social philosophy, the crisis of objectivity became apparent. It has become obvious that it is not possible to understand sociality or social classically (i.e., as the totality of “relations during and about production” or the totality of “social actions”). At the same time, the position of theoretical emptiness radically presented by Baudrillard cannot satisfy the demands of modern social philosophy.

In philosophy, always any, at first glance, theoretical problem turns into a practical, if not an urgent problem. The problem of “social”, besides the fact that it is a theoretical problem in sociology and related sciences, also turns into a problem in the functioning of classical social interactions and relations. In particular, all classical social institutions under construction based on the principle of production, for example, spiritual production, are under threat. Thus, the figure of the author of a work of art, as well as the figure of a scientist, appear simultaneously with such a form of social relation as a modern social subject, and are, in fact, its continuation. Therefore, the question arises: are classical art and science possible in a non-classically organized society?

The crisis recorded by the adherents of postmodernism, supported by real transformations of social relations, provokes a surge of interest in the study of the subject field of social philosophy. Upon careful consideration, two conditional trends or two areas of philosophizing can be distinguished. Today in social philosophy, there are two opposing points of view regarding its subject. The first comes down to the assertion of a special, supra-individual, non-natural reality - social reality. Such is the position of classical social philosophy, the position of Marx, Weber, Durkheim. The second position, characteristic of the second half of the 20th century, claims the absence of this very special social dimension and is most clearly formulated by Baudrillard in the thesis of the death of the social. We can say that there are two projects of social philosophy - modernist and postmodernist. The first revolves around the concept of social, the second we will try to reveal through the concept of “non-social”.

Today, talk of overcoming modernity and postmodernity, talk of “post-post-mo” / “after-post-mo” is becoming the commonplace of many researchers. Although, speaking about the post-post-mo situation, researchers often point to the exhaustibility of the theoretical constructs of postmodernism rather than the formulation of special theoretical provisions that allow us to talk about the quality of the paradigm bracket of post-post [Flier]. However, before trying to reach a “post-post”, it is necessary to distinguish and analyze once again the social structure of the postmodern era.

II. METHODS

The social project is a project of classical social philosophy, which, at least in its authentic historical form, has ended. As N.A. notes Tereshchenko, “Social is one of the most complex concepts of social philosophy ... the philosophy of society did not seem to bother to define its almost basic concept” [Tereshchenko, 167; Kanashiro, 2018]. Due to the lack of a clear definition of social among the classics themselves, we have to carry out a kind of reconstruction or reconception of the social. And here we will rely primarily on the work of N.A. Tereshchenko, D.A. Gasaryan and T.Kh. Kerimova. Despite the various reasons for dividing into modern and postmodern (in terms of Gasaryan and Karimov, the division into classical philosophy and non-classical), thinkers fix the same gap in the tradition of social philosophy. N.A. Tereshchenko directly divides the whole of social philosophy into “before” and “after” the “death of the social”. In both cases, the divide is Hegel’s dialectic or its radicalization.
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III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

As we have already said, the project of “non-social” can be characterized apothetically, deriving its characteristics from the above characteristics of social:
1) A special form of social relations, designated by us as “non-social” does not require participants to reflective and active attitude to existing social relations.
2) “Non-social”, as it is pure negativity and does not have positive and meaningful characteristics, does not have the prospect of radicalization and negation, and therefore development.
3) “Non-social” cannot be reduced or reduced to a single beginning or cause. There is a replacement of reductionism with irreductionism.

An example of the construction of a “non-social” society is the construction of Baudrillard [Baudrillard], Bauman [Bauman], Giddens [Giddens] and many others, however we will try to consider it on the example of not so radical theory. We will talk about the phenomenological sociology of A. Schütz and her successor to the sociology of knowledge in the version of P. Berger and T. Luckmann. They understand and interpret social as “everyday reality”. This refers to the reality that is everyday and ordinary for its participants. Everyday life is a concept which, according to the authors, is intended to remove the dialectical contradiction between consciousness and being [Vargas et al 2019; Feizuldayeva, et al 2018].

Arguing in this way, the authors “renounce” all ontological and epistemological issues, which they honestly admit in the program work “The Social Construction of Reality”. Reality is what a person living in this particular society considers as such that it is natural for him, knowledge is the idea of a particular subject about the world order.

Thus, on the one hand, individual representations of specific people construct everyday reality, on the other hand, individual representations are determined by everyday reality, objective for all. “Everyday life is a reality that is interpreted by people and has subjective significance for them as a whole world” [Berger, 38]. The thesis of the simultaneous subjectivity and objectivity of everyday life is the main and cornerstone for the authors, it underlies the structuring of the scientific work itself: the first chapter is devoted to clarifying the basic concepts and philosophical positions, the authors themselves call them “prolegomenes to the sociology of knowledge”, the second is called “Society as an objective reality”, the third - “Society as a subjective reality”. However, how is this connection possible, what is the mechanism? It is this question that is the main one for the authors: “... we must try to explain ... the objectivization of subjective processes (and meanings), with the help of which an intersubjective everyday world is constructed”.

The space of social or everyday life is a set of subjective objectivizations and typifications. Here, the authors clearly and distinctly build their continuity with the phenomenological tradition. However, everyday life is not only constructed individually and phenomenologically, but is also determined by two other parameters: intersubjectivity and language as a metastructure. The authors also interpret intersubjectivity in a phenomenological vein, understanding it as a face-to-face situation.
However, this situation is distinguished by its bi-directionality, since here we have at least two directions and two sources of "constructing reality": "mine and his "here and now" constantly collide with each other while the "face-to-face" situation lasts ... I see his smile, then, reacting to my frown, he stops smiling, then smiles again when he sees my smile, etc." [Berger, 52].

The face-to-face situation is a prototype of social interaction for the authors, the remaining cases are only deviations from it [Berger, 52].

This is a situation of a real meeting of two subjectivities, where they are clear and given to each other more than themselves [Berger, 53]. This is a situation of lively direct communication, but "on the other hand, even in a face-to-face situation, I comprehend the other by means of typification" [Berger, 55]. And the farther the situation of interaction is "face-to-face", the typification plays an increasingly important role, since the moment of immediacy fades. That is, the farther the second subject is from me, the more typically, through the "typing schemes", I perceive it, since it has less means to intervene and "break" the ordering of my typifications.

Language as the third moment of everyday life is a system of objectivization of subjective meanings, however, "the reality of everyday life is not just full of objectivization, it is possible only thanks to them" [Berger, 62]. It is language that embodies the objectivity of everyday life: "As a sign system, language has the property of objectivity. I encounter language as factuality external to me, and it exerts a coercive influence on me. Language subordinates me to its structures" [Berger, 67]. But language still has a very important function - thanks to the objectification of subjective meanings, distance from the subjects themselves, "language connects different zones of reality of everyday life and integrates them into a single semantic whole" [Berger, 68]. Moreover, language in general can go beyond the reality of everyday life. It can relate to experiences in finite domains of meanings and connect spheres of reality torn from each other. For example, one can interpret the "meaning" of sleep..." [Berger, 69].

Language plays the role of synthesis, if we discuss in terms of Hegelian dialectics. However, this is not a synthesis of the thesis and antithesis (transcendent and immanent), but two antithesis, two immanent, for example, two subjectivities. In fact, we can classify everyday life as "totalized immanent" in DA terminology. Gasparian. There is simply no place for the transcendent in phenomenological sociology, despite the fact that the word transcendence appears in the text, we are not talking about a breakthrough to the Other as transcendent, but simply to another immanent.

Therefore, we cannot interpret everyday life as social in the sense that we defined at the beginning, since there is no division into my attitude and available social relations: in fact, it is one and the same here. Goal setting is replaced by "practical motives" [Berger, 72], and real contradictions are replaced by failures in the communication of the participants in the situation face-to-face. Also, there will be no motive for development and negation, as well as reduction. The concept of everyday life does not imply any linear development or implementation of the plan. Also, it cannot be reduced to something single, transcendent, standing behind it. It is noteworthy that everyday life can be interpreted in the spirit of Baudrillard as a mass, and in the Bauman way, as a combination of individual and private objectivizations of subjectivities. However, if both Baudrillard and Bauman are trying to build historical continuity with the social of the New Age, then phenomenological sociology, at least in the person of A. Schütz himself, is sincerely convinced of a certain historicity of the everyday situation, this is described in great detail, for example, by L. G. Ionin [Ionin].

IV. SUMMARY

It seems to us that the main feature of the construction of social as "non-social" is the resolution of dialectical dualism into monism (mass, everyday life, etc.) and the subsequent (or simultaneous) disintegration of the single into small independent equal units. The first process is the essence of the process of movement of negativity, when History with a capital letter and history merge into one process of everyday life, and clear social institutions dissolve into mass. The second, as it seems to us, requires special explanation.

This logical course of the decay of the one into units is most accurately and capacitiously, in our opinion, described by Deleuze and Guattari and expressed by such a concept as "rhizome" [Deleuze]. The essence is the rejection of binary and centralization, the image of the root rhizome is directly opposed to the core, centering and ordering. Rhizome has no center and grows from any of its points and is a combination of equal systems that reproduce and copy themselves. The boundaries are erased, the order as such is absent, each rhizome is a continuation of not the previous one, but all of the rhizomes at once.

The movement is present, but there is nothing but this movement, there is no substrate or subject of movement, no final goal, no starting point. The movement is not so much non-linear as it has no direction in principle. All versions of the "non-social" project, in our opinion, are built on this principle, with the only difference being that this is sometimes done consciously as a protest against modernity, sometimes unknowingly, as is the case with phenomenological sociology.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Thus, the post-modern project of "non-social", in spite of the affirmed secondary nature and dependence on modern and social, is completely independent. Also, when developing and formulating possible new methods of theorizing and problematizing society, the risk of "reinventing the wheel" and "non-social" is quite high. That is why a clear understanding and conceptual limitation of the postmodern project of social philosophy is extremely important and relevant.

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REFERENCES


