

Interiorization and Internalization as Repressive Practices of the Subject Formation

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Abstract: *The article examines the problem of the subject power formation through the prism of structuralist methodology. The subjection concept is used to denote the process of subjectness repressive articulation. Subjection is defined as the discursive act of implanting power into a person and the transformation of this external power into internal subjectness and individual subjective features. Two forms of subjection are distinguished: interiorization and internalization. We made a theoretical analysis to identify the essential differences of these forms in this article. It has been established that interiorization is a rational process of subject formation through awareness, assimilation and reproduction of the external influence of social structures, and internalization is an unconscious process of subject formation through unconditional acceptance, assimilation and reproduction of the external influence of social structures. It is noted that, being independent mental processes, interiorization and internalization may not be repressive forms of subjection, but only represent the most general mechanism for the formation of internal structures of the psyche. We can talk about them as subjective processes only when the result of the subject's activity is already in the language or social practice. Thus, the article confirms the paradox of reference in the issue of subjectness formation: the subject does not exist before the fact of its subjection, but is the result of power formation.*

Keywords: *subject, subjectness, subjectivity, subjection, interiorization, internalization, repressive practices.*

I. INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of “subject” is one of the semantic objects of studying the socio-humanitarian science in the whole variety of processes and conditions of its formation. The conceptual diversity of this phenomenon, expressed in such categories as subjectness, subjectivity, subjection, also gives rise to various approaches to the interpretation of the subjectness essence as such. The first approach defines subjectness as activity feature, where subjectness acts as one of the facets of subjectivity [1]. With this approach, subjectivity is understood more broadly than subjectness, and is a holistic ontological feature of human being. The second approach is based on the identification of subjectness with the so-called agency. If we translate subjectness into English (and many other European languages), then the analogy will most often be the term “agency”, which refers us to the subordination experiments made by S. Milgram [2]. A theory of an agent state arises to explain why a person obeys power [3]. Agent state is characterized by the fact that the individual ceases to consider himself/herself as an independent and

freely acting individual, turning into an instrument of power, his/her agent. In the agent state, the subject simply shifts responsibility to the other, while he/she is fully aware that he/she is having some effect on the other subject. In a situation of subjectness, a person experiences activity as subjectivity, as his/her “I”. It is worth noting that this article actualizes precisely the first approach to the subject's problem. Subjectness is understood by us as an ontological feature of an individual and constitutes its significant part of subjectivity.

II. METHODS

The theoretical and methodological basis of this article is represented by structuralism and study of the influence of structures, practices and power mechanisms on the subject. In addition, in the course of a theoretical analysis of the distinction between the concepts of “interiorization” and “internalization”, we used the works of psychologists and teachers with experimental data on the research topic.

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The postmodern project of the subject interprets a person as a subject in a completely new way. According to this new view, the other ceases to be a support for him/her (“God died”), and a person loses his/her monopoly right to be a sovereign and master of himself/herself and being. In this regard, the subject's image appears as a slave, obeying the master [4].

When M. Foucault speaks about the relationship between power and subject, he emphasizes its repressive nature, introducing the French term “assujétissement” [5], which can be translated into Russian as “субъекция” after the English translation “subjection”. Subjection, according to the researcher, turns out to be a certain imperious power, a person's dependence on power and its codifications, penetrating into the person and overwhelming him/her.

Power is perceived in two ways: firstly, as something that presses the subject from the outside, suppresses its activity, forbids it to act, and secondly, as something that forms the subject, allows it being implemented in a person, and provides the very condition of its occurrence. Power in this sense is not just the actual external field of the subject, but the necessary internal mechanism for the implementation of subjectness. Subjection is a discursive act of implanting power inside, which a person does not observe, does not realize and does not control himself/herself, but which, paradoxically, gives rise to his/her subjectivity, supports it. According to J. Butler, “the usual model for understanding this process is as follows:

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power implements itself in us, and weakened by its strength, we internalize or accept its terms... Subjection means the process of becoming subordinated by the power and at the same time the process of becoming the subject" [6-14].

For M. Foucault, the implementation of subjectivity in a person is possible only due to the impact of a set of social discourses on the consciousness and ideas of the individual. To denote this complex, the author introduces the concept of "dispositive" [7], which denotes a certain set of social discourses (political, legal, moral, educational) that regulate certain social relations and form an individual's attitude towards these social relations. Dispositive supports a certain social process. In our case, this process is represented by subjectness. According to M. Foucault, subjection, i.e. subjectness formation, is carried out mainly through the body by certain social practices: confession, imprisonment, isolation of insanity, family, science, education [8]. These practices, settling in the subject, are reproduced without human effort, forming a way of interacting with him/her. The real subjects are the practices themselves, which are governed by those social structures in whose hands the power is concentrated.

M. Foucault considers only the basic modern practices of the subjectness formation. Modern social practices may be less institutionalized from a legal and political point of view, but they also play a huge role in the formation of a person as a historical subject: starting from family life practices and kindergarten, ending with the virtual practice of personal accounts and social networks. What is the subjection mechanism?

M. Foucault speaks of a modern subject and associates the subjection mechanism with the dispositive interiorization. It is assumed that the influence of dispositive can be realized and changed by the subject [9]. Without denying the role of discourses in the formation and implementation of postmodern practices, in our opinion, one needs to use a different concept that refers to slightly different mental and social mechanisms in order to explain the mechanism of formation of postmodern subjectness. We are talking about internalization, which differs significantly from interiorization.

In modern socio-humanitarian sciences, interiorization is understood as the process of forming the internal structures of the human psyche, which occurs due to the assimilation of the structures of external social activity. For the first time, the linguistic separation of the concepts of "interiorization" - "internalization" can be found in English by the American psychologist G. Fuerth. Analyzing the theory of knowledge of J. Piaget, G. Fuerth is inclined to the idea that two types, two ways of interiorization can be distinguished in his operational theory of the intelligence development. The first kind, which, in fact, can be called interiorization, is a consequence of the coordination of the general social form of knowledge and the specific meaningful external influence, which form a certain understanding of reality in the subject. The second type of interiorization associated with the process of latent and schematic movement of external influences into the internal content of various mental processes shall be designated as internalization: "internalization, in this regard, means that something that was external and observable gradually went inside and took on a hidden form" [10-15-16]. Thus, while one can talk about the internalization of a telephone number, an understanding of the structure and meaning of numbers in

this telephone number is a consequence of interiorization processes, i.e. coordination of social activities and communication [17].

Russian socio-humanitarian science also has authors emphasizing the fundamental difference between interiorization and internalization. As for interiorization, it is understood as an integral part of the general process of person's socialization. In this case, interiorization is the acquisition of some knowledge about reality, society, its values, and attitudes. Internalization is understood somewhat differently. According to E. Popova and T. Pushkareva (article "Interiorization in the Context of the Problem of Social Determination), two points have specific values of internalization. Firstly, due to this process, a certain new (or old) structure or substructure of the personality appears, and, secondly, the necessary consequence of this process is not just the knowledge of certain social values, norms, but their assimilation, acceptance: "You can know some social norm, but not follow it; you can know, but disagree with it, while fulfilling it in an "external" way; finally, you can accept it and make it your "internal" own norm" [11]. Internalization, in view of the fact that it has an unconscious basis, presupposes complete acceptance of the external, and more likely a person will first accept this norm, make it his/her own, and only then he/she will realize it.

Thus, it turns out that interiorization is directly related to the cognitive process of thinking, with the moment of conscious perception of external experience, while internalization occurs for the most part unconsciously, without requiring internal understanding and awareness for the external experience.

However, not everything that can be called internalization and interiorization is a subjection form. Obviously, Fuerth's examples of internalization of the telephone number and interiorization of the structure and the meaning of the numbers in this telephone number are not a form of imperious, repressive formation of the subject through power, since they do not imply further human activity in the form of a subject.

The situation is different with the examples of M. Foucault. Modern practices are a form of interiorization as a subjection, because they are associated with the conscious acceptance of a set of certain social ideas and their reproduction. Confession makes a person think about sin and desires; education imposes a certain system of thinking. Such internalization is possible only when there is already a subject. But we always deal with the paradox of reference - the subject does not exist before the fact of its subjection - in the issue of subjectness formation. The introduction of the term "internalization" is necessary and shows a different, repressive mechanism for the formation of a "power narrative "I" at the discourse level [12]. Therefore, internalization as a form of subjection is understood as the process of subjectness formation through unconscious acceptance and assimilation of external structures.

One of the striking examples of internalization is the formation of morality and moral subject. What is a "bad conscience" [13], if not an expression of subjection principle? The emergence of a bad conscience in the subject is connected with the fact of punishment, with the lender's desire to subordinate the debtor and compensate for damage.

It is the punishment that awakens a sense of guilt, a feeling of "remorse" in the subject. Therefore, the beginning of a "bad conscience", consists in the masochistic happiness of self-torture, and the internalization of punishment is, in fact, the production of "I", which, obviously, has an unconscious nature.

In this example, one more important difference between internalization and interiorization can be found as subjection forms. Interiorization is carried out due to the voice of reason and rationality and contributes to the development of this rationality. The modified practice of confession contributed to the formation of introspection and ability to self-reflection. The emergence of conscience, as indicated slightly above, is associated with fear of punishment and guilt. Therefore, internalization is based on the inverse forces of desires and feelings.

IV. SUMMARY

Thus, we can conclude that subjection is not a simple external or internal dependence on power, it ensures existence of the individual in the form of a subject, in the form of the implementation of certain subjective qualities. The mechanism of subjectivity formation is repressive and can be designated as subjection. Subjection is a discursive act of implanting power into a person and its transformation into subjectness and individual subjective features.

Based on the analysis of the subjection principle, we can distinguish two of its forms:

1) interiorization - a rational and conscious process of forming subjectivity and subjective qualities of a person through the assimilation of external structures dominant in relation to him/her.

2) internalization - unconscious process of forming subjectivity through unconditional acceptance and assimilation of external structures dominant in relation to it based on the satisfaction of human desires and feelings.

Such an understanding of interiorization and internalization is not universally valid, and is relevant only in those situations when we really fix the implementation of subjectivity and subjective qualities of a person. Both of these forms exist independently of each other throughout a person's life. Only due to them is it possible to implement a person as a subject - to embody a certain function of the social structure and practice in it. As a whole, being mental processes, interiorization and internalization may not be repressive forms of subjection, but only represent the most general mechanism for the formation of internal structures of the psyche.

V. CONCLUSION

It should be noted that the subject as a result of subjection is not a stable sign and a priori quality of a person, but rather a certain function of social institutions and structures in it. Thus, a specific social subject shall always be considered from the perspective of a dispositive, a real social practice that exists at the moment and defines it (the social subject) as an actor. Subjective processes are not implemented one-dimensionally and in isolation from others and are included in the general processes of identification and articulation.

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